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Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994
-Section-A-Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Central Act 3 of
1930)-Section 4-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 366
(29-A)-Seventh Schedule List II Entry 54-
Constitutional Validity of Section 4-A of the
Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994, as inserted by
Finance Act, 2004, and notification thereunder—Provision
seeking to levy single point sales tax on maximum retail
price published on packaged goods (Pharmaceutical
products) at the point of transaction between wholesaler
and retailer—Is violative of Entry 54 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution—Sale within the
ambit of above entry means completed sale of goods as
per Sale of Goods Act, 1930—Further, in
contradistinction to excise duty, levy under the Sales
Tax Act is not on the ‘goods’ but on ‘sale’—Maximum
retail price is relevant to the transaction between
retailer and end consumer—Levying sales tax on the
maximum retail price at the point of transaction between
wholesaler and retailer would be on the price qua which
the transaction has yet to take place or may not even
take place and thus falls foul with the legislative
competent under Entry 54 of List II of Schedule VII to
the Constitution—Section-A and the notification
thereunder are, therefore, invalid to that extent. [
Rajasthan Chemists Association v. State of Rajasthan &
Ors., Rajasthan High Court, D/d 29.3.2005, 2005(4) RDD
571 (Raj) (DB) D/d 29.3.2005 ]
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
Section
3- Human Blood-
whether falls within definition of
‘ drug’? -human blood is a substance
intended to be used in the treatment of diseases in
human beings and hence is a drug. [ Adharsha Hospital
vs. The Union of India and others, Karnataka High Court
, 2006 Drugs Cases (DC) 9]
Sections 3(b)(i)(iii) and 18
- definition of 'drug' -
Whether EC 350 (Vitamin E and Vitamin C Capsules) and
Cecure (Multi - Vitamin Capsules) manufactured by the
petitioner and sold in the market through medical shops
as "Dietary Supplements" falls within the definition of
"drug" requiring licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics
Act, 1940? - held the definition of 'drug' in the
Act the clearly specifies that all substances intended
to be used for mitigation of prevention of any disease
or disorder in human beings is a drug and further all
substances intended for use as components of a drug
including empty gelatin capsules is a drug - the two
items of Vitamins are filled in empty gelatin capsules.
So a combined reading of clauses (i) and (iii) of
Section 3(b) would show that the two items, EC 350 and
CECURE which are Vitamin E and Vitamin C and/or
multi-vitamin tablets would fall within the definition
of 'drugs' - as per Rule 43 of the Drugs and Cosmetics
Rules drugs specified in Schedule D shall be exempted
from the provisions of chapter III of the Act and of the
Rules made thereunder to the extent and subject to the
conditions specified therein. The items which are
exempted under schedule D, item 5 reads "the following
substances' which are used both as articles of food as
well as drugs : (1) all and minerals - by virtue of the
definition of 'drug' in the Act a substance which is
swallowed for mitigation or prevention of disease in
human beings or in animals is a medicine and a drug. The
two products in question is not used by any person as a
general dietary supplement. Vitamin deficiencies in
human being may result in certain diseases in human
beings. In such cases doctors prescribe these vitamin
capsules of a particular dozage which is for mitigation
or for prevention of such diseases. These vitamin
capsules will squarely fall within the definition of
'drug' under the Act - two items 'EC-350' and 'CECURE'
which are styled as 'dietary supplements' are 'drugs'
within the definition of the said word in Section 3(b)
of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. (Cadila
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of Kerala and Others,
KERALA HIGH COURTS, 2003 Drugs Cases 21)
Section 5(2)--- Drugs &
Cosmetics Rules, 1945---Rule 106-B-
Prohibition imposed on quantity and percentage of
alcohol in homeopathic medicines---contention
that mandatory procedural requirements of the Act not
followed as the Drugs Technical Advisory Board did not
have any representative with an expert knowledge in the
field of Homoeopathy untenable---Court cannot mandate
any change in statury provisions relating to
Constitution of the Board---sub-committee for
homoeopathic science constituted by Board—writ petiotion
dismissed. [ Shrikrishna Homoeo Pharmacy vs. Union of
India and others, Bombay High Court, 2006 Drugs Cases
(DC) 96]
Section 16 - Standards
of quality
Section 16, 17A, 17B, 27 and
32—18(a) (1), 25 and Drugs & Cosmetics Rules, 1945—Rules
4 and 8—expired drug—Standard drug does not include
expired drug—as a Doctor he had the duty and
responsibility to check the manufacturing date and
expiry date of the Vaccine before pushing it into the
body of one innocent and infant baby of only two months
old. The Doctor was the last person who could have saved
pushing of an expired drug into the body of a minor
baby. Vicarious liability of the Doctor is manifestly
transparent and clear in this case and he cannot be
absolved of the criminal responsibility in this
matter—the definition of Standard drug as defined in
section 16 of the Act does not include expired drug. In
the instant case from the seizure list, from the
statement of witnesses and from the invoice-cum-challan
it has been prima facie established that the expired
drug was used and expired drug cannot be included within
definition of standard drug.[Bimal Kumar Kundu vs.
State of West Bengal, Calcutta High Court, 2005 Drugs
Cases (DC) 240]
Taking of licence has nothing to do with fixation of
standards of quality - Taking of licence has nothing
to do with fixation of standards of quality. [Gopilal
Agarwal, Petitioner V State of
Orissa and another O.J.C. No 1005 of 1971,
decided on 2nd February 1972, Orissa High Court, G. K.
Misra, CJ. And R.K. Ray J., 1975 Drug Cases
13:AIR1973Ori 15
Section
17- Misbranded drug
The word ‘place’ is not a synonym for country and
definitely connotes different meaning from the
word country. The word ‘place’ is not a synonym
for country. The word definitely connotes different
meaning from the word country. Where the product of one
town is being described as the product of another town
it amounts to misbranding within the meaning of Section
17(b). [Dharam Deo Gupta,
Applicant V. State, Respondent, Cri. Rev. No. 14
of 1956 decided on 27th March 1958, All. High
Court ( Lucknow Bench), A.N.Mulla., J.,1979
FAC-6-183:AIR1958All1863]
Where the product of one town is being described as
the product of another town, it amounts to misbranding.
- Where the
product of one town is being described as the product of
another town, it amounts to misbranding within
the meaning of Section 17(b).[Angoori Devi,Applicant
V. State, Respondent,Criminal revision application
No.382 of 1972 ,decided on 10/3/1977, Allahabad High
Court,K.C.Agrawal,J, 1977 Drug Cases 9 ]
Drugs not labelled in prescribed manner are deemed to
be misbranded within the meaning of Section 17(e)
- Not a single bottle bore any label. The name of
the manufacturer, licence number, the batch number and
other mandatory particulars required by Rule 96 were
conspicuous by their absence. Thus, it is abundantly
clear that the respondents cannot escape the
consequences of his act in stocking a misbranded drug in
violation of Section 18(a ) ( ii) of the Act..[State
of Maharashtra, Appellant V. J.S. Ujawane, Respondent,
Criminal Appeal No.13 of 1975, decided on 15/6/1978,
Bombay High
Court, (Nagpur bench), Lentin and Joshi JJ., 1979
CRI.L.J. 530 : 1979 Mh.L.J.50]
Section 17B, 18 and 19 -
No prohibition in any of the provisions of the Act
that a dealer cannot be prosecuted for sale of spurious
drug or drug of below standard quality without
manufacturer being made a co-accused. Such a
conclusion by the High Court is not borne out from the
provisions of the Act - the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
in its order totally overlooked the provisions contained
in sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act which denies
defence plea to the accused that 'he was ignorant of the
nature, substance and quality of the drug or the
circumstances of its manufacture'. The only defence
available to him as set out in clause (b) of sub-section
(3)is that ' he did not know and could not, with
reasonable diligence have ascertained, that the drug or
cosmetic in any way contravened the provisions of the
Act'. This defence plea, if at all available to the
accused would be considered in accordance with
sub-section (1) read with sub-section (3) of section 19
of the Act only after the prosecution has led its
evidence to prove its case. (The State of Andhra
Pradesh vs. M/s. Venu Veterniary Division, SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA , 2003 Drugs Cases 32)
Section
18- Prohibition of manufacture and sale of
certain drugs and cosmetics.
In view of the principles enunciated in Section 24 of
the General Clause Act, notification issued under
Section 18 of the principal Act will be deemed to have
been issued under Section 18 as amended and fresh
notification is not necessary
Contentions on behalf of the respondent
- The Notification issued under Section 18 of the
principal Act will continue to be in force even after
amending Act 21 of 1962 and will be deemed to have been
issued under Section 18 as amended. Therefore it was not
necessary for the State Government to have issued a
fresh notification fixing a date for the purposes of
Section 18 as amended by amending Act 21 of 1962. [State
of Maharashtra,
Appellant V. Zahid Hussein, Respondent, Criminal
Revision No.124/1973, decided on 12-8-1974, 1975 Drug
Cases 165:1975 FAC 118: 1975 MAH L.J.455.]
S.18(c) r/w Rule 62 - Requirment
of separate licence for separate premises.
Licence under Section 18(c) read with Rule 62
required for storage for short spells and on ad-hoc
basis - The storage’ even though for short spells
and on ad-hoc basis and without intent to sell at that
place but as a part of sale business, comes within the
scope of ‘storage for sale’ in Section 18(c) and
Rule 62. [Swantraj and others, Appellants V. State of
Maharashtra, Respondent, Criminal Appeal No.177
of 1970, decided on 5/2/1974, Supreme Court, V.R.
Krishan Iyar and R.S.
Sarkaria JJ, 1974 CRI. L.J.472 (V.80 c 72 ):AIR 1974 SC
517]
A separate licence
for separate place is
required under Section 18( c)read with Rule 62-
The respondent was required
to obtain separate licence for separate place
under Rule 62. [State of Maharashtra, Appellant V.
Sevantilal Jasanglal, Shah, Respondent, Cri. A.No.
997/1975, decided on 6/10/1977, Bombay High Court, Apte, J. (1978) FAC 39:1978 CRI.L.J.1013]
Requirement of licence under Section 18(c)
Where a particular medicine is kept in the shop there
would be a presumption that it is for the purpose
of sale unless that presumption is rebutted by the
accused. - Held. -
Where a particular medicine is kept in the shop
there would be a presumption that it is for the purpose
of sale unless that
presumption is rebutted by the accused.
There is nothing in the statement of the accused
or in the evidence produced by him that these tubes of
Penicillin Ointment were kept in the shop not for the
purpose of sale but for any other purpose [Kasim
Bhai, Applicant v.. State , Respondent, Cri. R. No. 1229
of 1954, decided on 13th Jan 1956, Allahabad High Court,
Asthana, J., AIR 1956 All. 703, 1979 Drug
Cases.9:1956CRI.L.J.380:]
The intention of legislature was to penalise the
stocking or exhibiting of goods of sub standard quality
only if they were meant for sale - From the words in
sub-clause(a) of Section 18 it is seen
that a person can be convicted under the
provisions of this section only if the stocking or
exhibiting is for
the purpose of sale. The intention of legislature was to
penalise the stocking or exhibiting of goods of sub
standard quality only if they were meant for sale. Mere
stocking unless it
is for the purpose of sale does not amount to an
offence within the meaning of Section 18 of the Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
[Dharam Deo Gupta,
Applicant V. State, Respondent, Cri. Rev. No. 14
of 1956 decided on 27th March 1958, All. High Court (
Lucknow Bench), A.N.Mulla., J.,1979
FAC-6-183:AIR1958All1865 : 1958 CRI. L.J. 1453]
The term ‘stock’ means
‘ to keep’ and includes keeping or carrying
on one’s person. Storing in a place not
necessary to prove that drugs are
‘stocked’ for sale. Held - The plain
meaning of ‘stock’ is ‘ to keep’ and it is not
necessary that the drug should be
‘stored’ in a place in order
that it can be said to have been ‘stocked’
for sale. The large quantity of 95,000 capsules found in
possession of the appellant
leaves no doubt that he had stocked or kept the
drugs for
sale. It could not have been meant for his personal use.
[ Sk. Amir, Appellant V. The State of
Maharashtra, Respondent, Criminal Appeal No. 149 of
1970, decided on 9/1/1974, Supreme Court M.H. Beg and
Y.V.. Chandrachud., JJ.,
1974 CRI. L.J. 459 (V-80, C166) : AIR 1974 SC 469
: 1975 Drug Cases
25]
The possession simpliciter not punishable under
Section 18 read with Section 27of the Act. - Before
a person is liable for prosecution or conviction under
Section 27(a)(i) and (ii) read with Section 18(c) of the
Act, it must be proved by prosecution affirmatively that
he was manufacturing the drugs for sale or was selling
the same or had stocked or exhibited the articles for
sale. The
possession simpliciter of the articles does not appear
to be punishable under any of the provisions of the Act. [ Moh. Shabbir, Appellant V. State
of Maharashtra, Respondent, Cri. Appeal No.103 of 1973,
decided on17/1/1979, Supreme Court, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
and A.D. Koshal, JJ., 1979 CRI. L.J. 466: AIR 1979 SC
564]
The penal provisions of the Act do not contemplate
keeping of drugs for personal use.
- The penal provisions of the Act do not
contemplate keeping of drugs
for personal use.
In order to sustain a conviction under the Act,
it must not only be proved that the accused has kept the
medicines without licence, but it must also be proved
that they have been kept for selling the same. [
Mohan Nair, Petitioner V. State, Respondent, Cri.
Rev.C.No.810 of 1983, and C.R.P.No.793 of 1983, decided
on 25/4/86, Madras High Court, Swamikkannu, J., 1987 (I)
FAC 23
Bills and Registers produced--Sections 18(c),
22(1) and (3)—acquittal-appeal against- at the time
of examination, accused No. 1 produced all the bills and
registers, which he was supposed to maintain as per
Schedule K of the Act—the mediator’s report did not
disclose as to the specific records that are required to
be produced by accused No. 1—In view of the infirmities
the learned Magistrate rightly rejected the evidence of
P. Ws. 1 to 5 and held that the prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable
doubts. [Drugs Inspector, Bhimavaram vs. Dr. I.
Ramakrishna Gandhi and another, Andhra Pradesh High
Court, 2005 Drugs Cases (DC) 16]
S.18(c) r/w Section 27(a)(ii) of Act.-
Mere suspicious circumstances not sufficient to
establish charge under Section Contentions
on behalf of appellant - Though the circumstances
are sufficiently suspicious in nature, we are unable to
hold that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing
the charge under Section 18(c) r/w Section 27(a)(ii) of
Act. [ Dr. Sanat kumar Basu, Appellant V. State of
West Bengal, Opposite Party, Cri. A. No. 228 and Cri. Rev. No. 1920 of 1979 decided
on 4/10/83, Calcutta High Court, B.C. Chakarabarti and
I.N. Chudhari JJ.,
1984 CRI. L.J. 931].
Note
: Relying on Supreme Court decision in Mohd. Shabir
V. State of Maharashtra., various High Courts have taken
a similar view in (1)
Badirot Jamal, Petitioner V. State of Assam, Opposite
Party, Cri. Rev,. No. 54 of 1977, decided on
10/8/82,Gauhati High Court, S.M. Ali. J, 1983 CRI. L.J.
No:22(GAU). (2) Bawa Singh, Petitioner V. State of
Punjab, Respondsent, Cri. Rev. No. 1632 of 1979 decided
on 6/7/1982, Punjab and Haryana High Court, Rajendra
Nath Mittal, J., 1983 CRI. L.J. No. 60 (Punj &Har):
(1982) 9 CRI,. L.J. 237.
(3) State
of Karnataka, Petitioner V. Channkeshwara Medicals and
others, Cri. A.No. 3988of 1988, decided on 27/1/1992,
Karnataka High Court, D.P. Hiremath and C. Shivappa JJ.,
1993 Drugs Cases 56].
Circumstances make it clear that stock was for sale
and not for personal use -Circumstances
make it clear that stock was for sale and not for
personal use. We therefore, uphold the conviction of the
accused. [State of Maharashtra,Appellant V.
Hasmukhrai Fulchand Shah, Respondent, Cri. Appeal No.
146/1976, decided on 31/8/1977, Bombay High Court,
Deshmukh and Agarwal, JJ, 1988 (1) FAC 98]
The evidence of large scale possession of drugs was
beyond any doubt capable of no other
explanation excepting that the drugs had been
stocked for the purpose of sale - The learned
Magistrate grievously misconstrued the evidence because
the evidence of large scale possession of drugs was
beyond any doubt capable of no other explanation
excepting that the drugs had been stocked for the
purpose of sale. [State, Appellant V. Puran Lal Ahuja,
Respondent, Criminal Appeal NO.64 of 1984, decided on
29/8/1985, Delhi High Court, Rajinder Sachar, C.J. and
Malik Sharief-Ud-Din, J., 1986 CRI.L.J. 1715]
When drugs are found in a chemist shop having
business of retailing in drugs, only inference is they
were stocked for sale
regardless of whether they are in a cupboard or
in kerosene tin.. Sending a bogus customer or to
produce counterfoils of bills, etc. not necessary.
It would be carrying the burden of proof too far.
- Where the accused is a Chemist and where his business
is of retailing in drugs and where substandard drugs are
found in shop, regardless of whether they are in a cupboard or in kerosene tin, there can
be no other inference except that they were stocked for
sale. [State of Maharashtra, Appellant V. Jethmal
Himatlal Jain and another, Respondents, Criminal Appeal
No.249 of 1985, decided on 25/3/1994, Bombay High Court,
M.F. Saldanha J., 1994 CRI. L.J. 2613.]
After insertion of the words ‘offer for sale’ in
Section 18 by amendment in 1982,earlier decision in Mohd.
Shabir V.State of Maharashtra, 1979 Drug Cases 1, is
distinguished and considered not applicable.-
- Ultimately the manner of keeping or exhibiting them in
a shop would assume relevance and importance to see if
they were really offered for sale. We have considered
the facts of the case in the light of meaning that could
be attributed to the words ‘offer for sale’, namely
that whether such articles are displayed in a shop so as
to make a customer know that they were available for
purchase. As this element in the facts of the case is
not proved, we find no grounds to interfere with the
Judgment of the trial Court. [State of Karnataka,
Appellant V. M/s. Kannika Stores and others,
Respondents, Cri. A.
No. 615 of 1988, decided on 9-12-1992, Karnataka High Court, D. I. Hiremath and L.
Sreenivasa Reddy, JJ., 1993 Drug Cases 266.]
Comment.
- The prosecution case was that the drugs were stocked
in the racks. The complainant had deposed in the Court
and there was no reason to disbelieve him. The panch
witness pw2 was already declared hostile. The pw3 had
only stated that he has not seen the accused selling any
drugs in their shop. Much importance should not have
been attached to his
negative statement. The High Court, rightly came
to the conclusion that in view of amended Section 18,
the decisions relied upon by the trial Court are not
applicable to the facts of the case. It is a common
knowledge that household drugs like Aspro, Anacin, Vicks
etc., are sold by General and Provision Stores. The
customer, as a matter of routine approaches a shop for
purchase of articles under genuine belief that
commodities in the shop are for sale. Such belief does
not depend on the manner of storing the commodity. For a
customer it is immaterial whether a commodity is stored
on the floor or on the table or in the racks. With due
respect it is submitted that the fact that drugs were
recovered from a shop should have been considered enough
to presume that they were offered for sale, especially
when the High Court came to the conclusion that
the decision in Mohd. Shabir V. State is not
applicable to the facts of the case. The law laid down
in Jethmal Jain V. State and
State V. Puran lal appears to be correct
appreciation of precedents, facts and law.
S.18(c) r/w Schedule K. entry 5A - Extent
of exemption to the hospitals
Hospitals not exempted from obtaining licence to
manufacture drugs for distribution. -The hospital
can claim exemption under Rule 123 from obtaining
licence for sale and there is nothing in Sch. ‘K’ to
show that hospital is exempted from btaining licence for
distribution of drugs, which they manufacture. [Dr.
Aletta Grace Bell, Petitioner V. Dr.(Miss) S.Trikay and
another, Respondents, Civil W. P. NO. 3326 of 1979,
decided on 17/7/80, Patna High Court, K.B.N.Singh, C.J.
and P.S. Sahay J., 1982 (II) FAC 389:AIR1981Pat 17] Overruled by the Supreme Court in Dr. Aletta Grace Bell, V.
Dr.(Miss) S.Trikay and another, Supreme Court, AIR 1996
S.C.538. please see serial no - page-.
The Form of licence to manufacture drugs for
distribution was not provided on the date of offence.
Hospitals were not required to obtain licence for
manufacture and distribution of drugs..
In the absence of the requisites laid down in
Section 18(c) and 33 of the Act, the hospital could not
be required to obtain licence for manufacture and
distribution of drugs on the date when the offence was
allegedly committed. [Dr. Aletta Grace Bell,
Petitioner V. Dr.(Miss) S.Trikay and another, Respondents, Civil Appeal No.85, decided
on 8/11/1995, Supreme Court, AIR 1996 S.C.538]
Comment
- The Supreme Court judgment has overruled the judgment
of the Patna High Court.
Hwever, in the Supreme
urt judgment the words ‘on the date when the
offence allegedly committed’ are important and should
be noted. By Act 68 of 1982, the words for distribution
have been inserted in clause (e) of sub-section (2) of
Section 33, Section 18(a) and in form
25, 28. As
a result of this amendment, it is clear that now
hospitals are required to obtain licence if they want to
manufacture drugs even for distribution to their own
patient.
S.18(c) r/w Schedule ‘K’ Entry 5
- Exemption to the Registered Medical
Practitioners
The accused is not absolved of the criminal liability
under Section 18( c) of the Act merely because
negotiations were going on with the Government. -
Where offence has been committed under any provision of
law in vogue, the fact that some negotiations are going
on which may alter the liability of the accused would
not turn back the wheel of the time and obliterate the
commission of the act constituting
the offence.
The liability of the petitioner under Section
18(c) r/w Section 27 is not changed and Court could not be said to
have committed any error by not permitting the
examination of witnesses from the other States. [P.D.
Puri, Petitioner V. State, Respondent, Criminal Revision
Application No. 181 of 1974, decided on 21/11/94, Delhi
High Court, P.S. Saffeer, J., 1975, CRI. L.J. 1075: 1975
FAC 377]
The petitioner entitled to practice modern system of
medicine only in Punjab
and not in Delhi. The sub-section (3) of
Section 17 of Indian Medicines Central Council Act, 1970
cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of existing
rights and entitlements. -The petitioner not authorised
to stock, exhibit and sell or distribute modern drugs
without requisite licence under the Act. [Mohinder
Singh, Petitioner V. The State, Respondent, Cri.
Revision No.17of 1979 decided on 1/8/79, Delhi High Court, Yogeshwar Dayal, J,
1979 FAC 205:1979 Drug Cases 113].
The decision based on overruled authority
cannot be sustained. -
The accused cannot legally stock or keep in his
possession allopathic medicines at his shop for sale.
The observation of the trial Court based on the
authority in Phool singh’s case cannot legallly be
sustained [The State of Punjab, Appellant V. Lashkar
Singh, Respondent, Cri. Appeal No.148 of 1987, decided
on 29.11.1991, Punjab and Haryana High Court, S. S.
Grewal and A. S. Netra, JJ, 1996 Drugs Cases 402]
The Practitioners of the Indian
System of Medicine that is Ayurveda (including
Siddha) or Unani are not entitled to keep allopathic
drugs for administering to the patients [Swaran
Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 P & H 81]
S.18-A. Disclosure of the name of the
manufacturer, etc. –
For application of Section 18A the person concerned
shall not be a manufacturer or his agent. The
person concerned to whom Section 18A applies is anyone
other than the manufacturer or his agent. -
It is obvious that for application of the Section 18 A,
the person concerned shall not be a manufacturer of drug
or his agent. In other words, the person to whom Section
18A applies is anyone other than a manufacturer or his
agent for distribution thereof. The reason d’etre of
it is that, if he is the manufacturer or his agent he
cannot disclose the name of the person from whom he
acquired the drug because he himself is its
manufacturer. To expect the other way is to expect the
impossible. Hence, there is no question of requiring him
to disclose the identity of the person from whom he
acquired the drug. Exclusion of manufacturer and his
agent from the purview of section 18A is therefore on
understandable premise. The Supreme Court set aside the
order of the acquittal under Section 28 passed by the
High Court and restored the conviction of the accused
under Section 18A. [State of Orissa Appellant V.
Janmejoy Dinda, Respondent, Criminal Appeal No.219 of
1998, decided on 20-2-1998, Supreme Court, M.K.Mukherjee
and K.T.Thomas,JJ., 1998 CRI. L.J. 2046] Decision of
Orissa High Court in State of Orissa V. Janmejoy
Dinda, 1996 CRI. L.J. 2250 overruled.
When the defence version that they fulfilled
obligation under Section 18A has not been rebutted,
the charge under Section
18A cannot be proved. - Held. - The Inspector has
not been examined, nor his report proved. Obviously,
therefore, the defence version remained unrebutted and violation of Section 18A remained
unestablished. [State
of Karnataka, Appellant V. Pratap Chand and others,
Respondents, Cri. A. No. 91 of 1976, decided on
11-3-1981, Supreme Court, O.Chinnappa Reddy and Baharul
Islam, JJ., 1981 CRI. L.J. 595 :AIR 1981 SC872]
It is not necessary that all witnesses must sign
the seizure list and all witnesses must be examined
- It is not requirement of law that all the seizure
list witnesses must be examined. It is not necessary
that all witnesses must sign the seizure list or else
their presence should be disbelieved. [Dr.
Sanat Kumar Basu, Appellant V. State of West Bengal,
Opposite party, Cri. A. No. 228, and Cri. R. No. 1920 of
1979, decided on 04.10.83, Calcutta High Court, B. C.
Chakrabarti and J. N. Chaudhary, JJ, 1984, CRI.
LJ.931.]
Police officer’s powers of search and seizure
under the Code are not taken away by Section 22 of the
Drugs Act. Held - Search and seizure by Sub-Inspector of Police in presence
of Drugs Inspector was not illegal and
prosecution not vitiated
[ Bichitrananda Swain, Petitioner, V. State of
Orissa, Opposite Party, Cri. Rev. No. 195 of 1982,
decided on -22-12-1986,Orissa High Court, K.P. Mohapatra,
J. 1988 CRI. L.J. 292].
Separate punishment cannot be imposed under
Section 22(1)(c ). -
The Rule 54A prohibits contravention of a
prohibitory order made under Section 22(1)(c) and
Section 27(b) itself makes such contravention punishable
with imprisonment or with fine or with both.
Section 22(1)(c) does not provide separate
punishment. [ Manoj Drugs House and Another,
Appellants V. State of Karnataka, Respondents, Cri. A.No.
96 of 1975, Supreme Court, R.S. Sarkaria and A.C. Gupta, J.J., 1981 CRI. L.J. 348] Decided with
Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory V. State of
Karnataka. Judgment
of Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka V. Manoj
Drug House and others, 1975 Drug Cases 179 : 1975(2)
Kant. L.J. 17 (DB) : 1975 Mad. L.J. 211 overruled.
Only a person from whom sample is drawn and
person whose name is disclosed is entitled to a copy
of the report and a counterpart of the sample. - Disclosure
of the names and addresses of accused No.4 to 6 by the
third accused would not be disclosure under Section 18A
and consequently they are not entitled to make use of
sub-section (3)and (4) of Section 25. [R.Dayalan and others, Misc. Petition
No.3833/1979, decided on 27/7/78, Madras High Court,
Paul, J., 1979 FAC(1) 29:1978 CRI.L.J.1852:1978 Mad.L.W.
(Cri.)146]
The manufacturer is not entitled to get the copy
of report and portion of sample when his name is
not disclosed under Section 18A of the Act.
- The manufacturer is not entitled to get the
copy of report and portion of sample when his name is
not disclosed under Section 18A of the Act. He cannot
claim that he is deprived of his right to have the drug
analysed from Central Drug Laboratory.
[Manager, Medico Pharmaceutical Processors, Petitioner
V. State of H.P. and others, Respondents, Cr. M.P. (M) No.295 of 1981, decided
on 7/10/1982, Himachal Pradesh High Court, Vyas Dev
Misra, C.J. 1983 CRI.L.J.
67] Overruled by divisional bench of Himachal Pradesh
High Court in Kiran Dev Singh V. State of Himachal
Pradesh.
S.22(1)(c) (i)
search or
seizure by a Drugs Inspector
Since
under the Drugs & Cosmetics Act a search or seizure by a
Drugs Inspector is equated to a search and seizure under
the authority of a warrant, it is not necessary for a
Drugs Inspector to record his reasons for making a
search; Public [Prosecutor vs. Mahaveer Prasad, 1972
Cri LJ 1546, 1976 Drugs Cases 79]
S.22(1)(c) (iii)
Order prohibiting disposal of certain
drugs
An Order prohibiting disposal of
certain drugs is invalid and illegal because it can be
issued only for specified period not exceeding 20 days
under Section 22(1) (c) [B. K. D. Rajeswari
vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1984 Ker 95, 1983 Drugs Cases
58]
S.23(4)(iii). Procedure of Inspector etc.
-Sample Portion to Manufacturer
Contention is advanced on a misconception that the mode of challenge against the Report of the Government Analyst is by sending the portion of the sample kept with vendor. In case where the drug or medicine has passed from the manufacturer to a wholesaler (a distributor) and then to a retailer, the obligation of the Inspector as for giving portions of the sample would end up by giving it to the retailer and also to the distributor. The manufacturer, who is not entitled to be supplied with a copy of the report of the Government Analyst, has liberty to Challenge the correctness of the facts stated in the report by resorting to any other modes by which such facts can be disproved. He can avail the remedy indicated in Sub-Section (4) of Section 25 of the Act by requesting the court to send the other portions of the sample remaining in the Court to be tested at the Central Drugs Laboratory. Acquitting offending manufacturers only on the legi
slative lacuna would be hazardous to public health and the lives of the patients to whom drugs are prescribed by medical practitioners would be in jeopardy.
[Amrey Pharmaceuticals & anr vs. State of Rajasthan, 2001 Drugs Cases 168, Supreme Court Of India, 16.3.2001]
S.25
(4). Reports of Government Analyst etc.
On Account of inaction and lack of diligence on part of the Drugs Inspector, the valuable right, which is vested in the accused
under Section 25(4), had been lost. Proceedings against petioners were quashed.
[Ashok Sureshchand Bal & others vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 Drugs Cases 114]
Right of the petioners to get the sample retested
The copies of report of Government Analyst were received by the petitioners on 1.6.1995, but in spite of that admittedly the petioners did not notify their intention to adduce their evidence in controversion of the said report within 28 days either to the Inspector or the Court concerned. The right of the petioners to get the sample re tested by Central Drugs Laboratory through the trial Court stood extinguished and the report of the Government Analyst became conclusive evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Act.
[K. Guruswami and another vs. State of Maharashtra, 2001 Drugs Cases 193, Bombay High Court, 16.9.2000]
Apart from the mode prescribed in S.25(4) the sample
can be sent for analysis to the Central Drugs Laboratory
- the mode prescribed under S.25(4) is one
method of sending it to the Director of the Central
Drugs Laboratory. The other method is by the Drugs
inspector sending it direct as contemplated under the
first part of S.25(1) It is significant the sub-sec. (4)
of Section 25 starts with the words "unless the sample
has already been tested or analysed in the Central Drugs
Laboratory. (Ram Shankar Misra vs. State of U.P.,
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 2003 Drugs Cases 285)
Section
27.
Section 27 (a) and (b) read with
section 18 (a)(1)(ii)—spurious drugs seized from
retail chemist—supplier or manufacturer not arrayed as
party—complaint filed by Drug Inspector himself who is
conducting prosecution himself—same practice being
followed in numerous cases pending trial—suitable
directions needs to be issued—Drug Controller directed
to file reply on questions framed.[State through the
Drug Inspector, Delhi vs. M/s Deep Medical Stores and
another, Delhi High Court, 2005 Drugs Cases (DC) 509]
Section
18, 27 and 28—offence under—the sessions Judge was
right in holding that the Chief Judicial Magistrate
could try the case as he was empowered to try the case
and impose appropriate punishment in view of section 36
of the Act. But the Sessions Judge was not justified in
passing the order of discharge of the accused for the
offence under section 27 (a) of the Act—the accused were
entitled to plead for discharge in case a charge was
framed against them. However, the sessions Judge could
not have discharged the accused when he himself was
holding that the order of transfer/ committal was not
justified—the accused shall be at liberty at raise all
contentions that are available to them and the accused
would also be at liberty to raise the plea that no
offence was made out under section 27 (a) of the Act in
view of the averments made in the complaint and the
evidence adduced by the complainant.[State of
Rajasthan vs. M/s Mittal Distributors and another,
Supreme Court of India, 2005 Drugs Cases (DC) 363]
Neither the trial Court nor the appellate court have
given any reasons for imposing the sentence of one month
- as the provisions of law stand term of
imprisonment cannot be reduced to fine only. (Ram
Shankar Misra vs. State of U.P., SUPREME COURT OF INDIA,
2003 Drugs Cases 285)
Fine in lieu of imprisonment-Two questions for consideration arose in Criminal Appeal before the Apex Court (i) Whether a company can be attributed with mens rea on the basis that those who work or are working for it have committed a crime and can be convicted in a criminal case? (ii) Whether a company is liable for punishment of fine if the provision of law contemplates punishment by way of imprisonment only or a minimum period of punishment by imprisonment plus fine whether fine alone can be imposed?
For the first question, three-judge Bench of Apex Court was of the opinion that mens rea involves positive act of commision or omission and since company is a juristic person the proposition of 'punishing a company' cannot be accepted. It could neither be imprisoned, nor be asked to pay a fine. However, the ruling does not apply to a company's directors and employees, who can be punished with imprisonment or imprisonment and fine. Since the punishment prescribed under other economic laws are similar, the ruling can be extended to legislation on wealth Tax Act, Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, Negotiable Instruments Act, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Essential Commodities Act, Indian Merchandise Act, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
As regards the second question, Apex Court held that under the present Indian law it is difficult to impose fine in lieu of imprisonment. Further the Hon'ble Court held that under those sections where imprisonment has been made compulsory for an offence, it is not open to a Court to impose a sentence of fine only and not to award any substantive sentence if the Court finds a company guilty under the Section. If the Court does so, it would be altering the very scheme of the Act and usurping the legislative function. To bring such a fundamental change in criminal jurisprudence is a legislative function. Only Parliament can do it. Corporate criminal liability cannot be imposed without making corresponding legislative changes.
[Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 1994,The Assistant Commissioner, Assessment-II, Bangalore and Ors. Vs.M/s Velliappa Textiles Ltd. and Ors., decided on 16.9.2003]
Section
32-
Cognizance of offences---quashing
of proceedings---FIR lodged against medicines
shops running without licences by Deputy
Superintendent of Sub-Divisional Hospital---as per
Section 32 prosecution under the Act can be only
instituted by an Inspector or other competent persons
authorised to do same---lodging of FIR contrary to
provisions of the Act is bad in law---proceedings
quashed [Basudeo Gupta vs. State of Bihar and others,
Patna High Court, 2006 Drugs Cases (DC) 12 ]
Section 33-C
Injectable material being marketed as ayurvedic
injection - do not find place in any of the ayurvedic
texts and are also not listed in Ayurvedic Pharmacopoeia
of India. As regards the data to be furnished by the
firm about efficacy, safety and clinical trial of the
products, the Committee formed an opinion that
sufficient data was not furnished in sprite of adequate
opportunity having been allowed. The Committee of
Experts concluded that the ayurvedic injections marketed
by the petitioner firm required to be prohibited - held
whether to permit or not to permit ayurvedic injections
is a policy decision requiring thought and consideration
to be given to people's health and treatment methods -
adjudication on such issues does not fall within the
scope of judicial review and the jurisdiction of this
Court The petitioner is still at liberty to pursue its
case with the Government of India (M/s. Sidi Pharmacy
(P) Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others ,
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 2003 Drugs Cases 292)
S.34.Offence by Companies-
Section 34 (2)—Drugs and Magic
Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act,
1954—sections 7 and 9—Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973—sections 482—offences by company—petition for
quashing of proceedings filed by directors of company
charged with offences under section 3(d) of Drugs and
Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954
stating that they were not responsible for conduct of
business of the company—admitted that they as directors
frame policy decisions of the company—no other directors
in the company—hence petitioners liable to be
prosecuted—petition dismissed. [Suresh Kumarji Sharma
and another vs. State of A. P., Andhra Pradesh High
Court, 2005 Drugs Cases (DC) 348]
Chairmain & two directors were impleaded without evidence. No allegations in Complaint that petitioners were in charge or responsible to the company for the conduct of the business. Complaint in absence of such allegations is not maintainable. [Lal Chand Patni & others vs. State of Haryana, 2002 Drugs Cases 539, Mrs. Kavita Mittal vs. Drugs Inspector, 1994 Drugs Cases19]
Vicarious liability of a person for being prosecuted for an offence arises if at relevant time, he was in charge of and was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The onus of proving that a particular director was in charge of and also responsible to the conduct of the business of the company is on the prosecution. If it is shown that a particular director has overall control over the day to day business of the company then in that event, there will be transformation of onus of proof from prosecution to the accused. [Pannalal Sunderlal Choksi and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2001 Drugs Cases 7, Bombay High Court, 14.9.2000]
Drugs and Cosmetics
Rules, 1945
Rule 122F (1), Explanation---Blood
bank---a hospital engaged in operations of
collection, storage, processing or distribution of human
blood comes within definition of blood bank, hence is
required to obtain a licence under Rule 122F---writ
petition dismissed [ Adharsha Hospital vs. The Union
of India and others, Karnataka High Court , 2006 Drugs
Cases (DC) 9]
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—
Section 274, 275 and 465—submission
of the charge sheet under section 279. [Bimal Kumar
Kundu vs. State of West Bengal, Calcutta High Court,
2005 Drugs Cases (DC) 240]
Section 482—petition under—excise
duty—payment evaded by A2 and A3—in manufacture of
NIVARAN 90 herbal materials not contained—non-ayurvedic
preparation shown as ayurvedic preparation, exclusively
for the purposes of evading excise duty—it is for the
petitioners to explain as to how and under what
circumstances they were necessitated to purchase
synthetic materials which could as well be utilized for
the preparation of their products. Unless and until
satisfactory explanation comes forth from the
petitioners, it is possible from the circumstances
narrated, that they should have necessarily purchased
the synthetic articles only to make it useful in the
manufacture and production of the so-called ayurvedic
preparation-NIVARAN 90.[M/s Velvette International
Pharma and others vs. The Deputy commissioner of Central
Excise, Madras High Court, 2005 Drugs Cases (DC) 237]
Sections 482—offences by company—petition for
quashing of proceedings filed by directors of company
charged with offences under section
3(d) of Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable
Advertisements) Act, 1954 stating that they were not
responsible for conduct of business of the
company—admitted that they as directors frame policy
decisions of the company—no other directors in the
company—hence petitioners liable to be
prosecuted—petition dismissed.[Suresh Kumarji Sharma
and another vs. State of A. P., Andhra Pradesh High
Court, 2005 Drugs Cases (DC) 348]
Drugs and Cosmetics (6th Amendment) Rules 2001
Enhancement of fee of drugs licence - held the
enhancement cannot be said to be so exorbitant as to
amount to an unreasonable restriction on the right of
the petitioner to do trade and business under Article
19(i)(g) of the Constitution. Primarily it is for the
Government to decide at what rate licence fee is to be
fixed and not for the Court - no violation of Article
19(i)(g) or Article 14 of the Constitution.
(Tribhuwan Mittal vs. Union of India and others,
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT., 2003 Drugs Cases 300)
Drugs
and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act,
1954 -
Sections 3, 4 , 5 and 7 - complainants
claiming herself to be "Divine Mother" having
supernatural powers for curing many diseases and also
had in a Television Talk claimed of curing cancer
patients - offence if any committed? - Held it is
sufficiently clear that in the alleged advertisement in
news papers there is no indication of use of any Drug
for the purposes as enumerated under Section 3 of the
Act. It is simply indicated in the advertisement that
the problems enumerated therein can suprisingly be
solved. Such advertisement is published under the
heading "Jyotish" (means Astrology) indicating that it
would be supernatural or spiritual or astrological
solution. Spiritual, supernatural or astrological
activities are not prohibited in this country, nor
taking avocation of Astrologer is an offence and
accordingly, publication of advertisement of Astrology
or of an Astrologer cannot be construed to be an offence
under the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable
Advertisement) Act, 1954 or under any of the statute -
publication of an advertisement in the manner done in
this case cannot be construed to be an offence
punishable under Section 7 of the Act - it is a
conviction of the complaint that cancer cannot be cured
by Stones or Metallic substance as because this is a
clinic disease, as has been opined by the Cancer
Experts. On the other hand, the appellant opined in the
Televisions discussion that cancer patients could be
cured by spiritual or supernatural power. but mere
opinion on a questionable topic cannot be construed to
be an offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act.
However, in the alleged advertisement in the Newspapers
it was never claimed that cancer can be cured by Magic
Remedy. (Prabir Ghosh vs. Smt. Jaya Ganguly and
another, CALCUTTA HIGH COURT, 2003 Drugs Cases 125)
Medicinal and Toilet
Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955
Section
2(k) -- old spice and blue stratos -- shave
lotions manufactured by Colfax Laboratories -- whether
toilet preparation or medicinal preparation? -- held
ASLs manufactured by Colfax are ‘toilet
preparations’ within the meaning of Section 2(k) of
the Act. The High Court has also examined the matter
threadbare and has arrived at the same finding -- no
reason to disagree with the view taken by the Excise
Commissioner, who is an expert in the field.[Supreme
Court Of India, The State of Goa and another Appellants
versus M/s. Colfax Laboratories Ltd. and another
Respondents, Civil Appeal No. 414 of 2000 (With C.A. No.
415 of 2000), Date of Decision: 10/29/2003 , 2003 Drugs
Cases 316]
Bihar Excise Act, 1915
Section 2(12a) --
'intoxicant' -- legislative competence of the State
Legislature in redefining the word in section 2(12a) --
by including therein [State of Bihar and others v.
Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan (P) Ltd. and others ,
Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal Nos. 1543-1547 of
1999, D/d 11.1.2005,
2005 SCCL.COM 33]
Essential Commodities Act, 1955-
Section 11-- Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940—section
21—Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 21—Officer
competent to file complaint—public servant—Drug
Inspector appointed by Central or State Government
deemed to be a Public Servant hence competent to file
complaint under section 11 for contravention of
provisions of an order. Section 7—Essential
commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981—Sections 12A—drug
being sold at a higher price—plea that the Sessions
Court not being a Special Court cannot take cognizance
of offence—vide notification dated 20.3.84 Sessions
Court designated as special Court hence empowered to try
the offences under the Act. [M/s Laxmi Medical
Distributors vs. State of A. P., Andhra Pradesh High
Court, 2005 Drugs Cases (DC) 359]
N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 -
Sections 2(xx), (xxiii), 8, 9, 21, 22 and Entry Nos.92
and 110 of the Schedule- Drugs and Cosmetics Rules,
1945-Rule 97-Buprenorphine Hydrochloride a
psychotropic substance within meaning of NDPS Act and a
Schedule H drug within meaning of Drugs and Cosmetics
Act and Rules---manufacture, sale etc, regulated by
Drugs and Cosmetics Act and Rules and not by the NDPS
Act---not included in Schedule I of NDPS Rules. [Rajinder
Gupta vs. State, Delhi High Court, 2006 Drugs Cases (DC)
52]
Sections 8(c), 2, 22, 29 and 37--- Drugs and Cosmetics
Rules, 1945—Rule 61 (1), (2) and 97---Bail---granting
of Buprenorphine Hydrochloride ampoules and injections
recovered from petitioners---a Psychotropic substance
under NDPS Act but not included in Schedule I of the
NDPS Rules---a Schedule H drug within the meaning of
Drugs and Cosmetics Act and Rules---manufacture, sale
and possession not prohibited under provisions of NDPS
Act or Rules---bail granted. [Rajinder Gupta vs.
State, Delhi High Court, 2006 Drugs Cases (DC) 52]
Section 21 , Rule 66 -- accused charged under
and in possession of 25 ampoules of manufactured drug,
namely - Buprenorphine Hydrochloride (Tidigesic)
alongwith three syringes when he was apprehended on the
road was found guilty of the offence punishable under
Section 21 of the NDPS Act and was sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of
rupees one lakh --appeal filed dismissed -- review
petition -- the psychotropic substance namely, --
Buprenorphine Hydrochloride (Tidigesic) found in
possession of the appellant was not in breach of Rule 66
of the NDPS Rules and having regard to the fact that the
same was for his personal consumption, no offence under
Section 21 of the NDPS Act is made out.( Sajan
Abraham Appellant versus State of Kerala, Supreme Court
of India, 2004 SCCL.COM 228(Case No: Criminal Appeal
No.1022 of 1997), D/D 262//2004)
Constitution of India-
Articles 14 and 19(1)(g)--- Drugs & Cosmetics Rules,
1945---Rule 106-B---
Prohibition imposed on quantity and percentage of
alcohol in homeopathic medicines—challenged on
ground that it makes unreasonable discrimination between
Homoeopathic and Ayurvedic manufacturers—not necessary
for legislature to regulate every conceivable activity
in order to regulate something—it can recognize and
distinguish between degrees of evil and regulate those
areas where its intervention is most
required—classification not arbitrary or
unconstitutional—writ petition dismissed. [
Shrikrishna Homoeo Pharmacy vs. Union of India and
others, Bombay High Court, 2006 Drugs Cases (DC) 96]
Articles 16, 309 and 311 -- Central
Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
-- Rule 2(h) --
Respondent appointed as Drug
Inspector on short term contract on fixed salary --
advertisement issued for regular selection -- respondent
disqualified on ground of over-age -- respondent not a
Government servant as he was working on contract basis,
hence not eligible for relaxation of upper age limit --
appeal allowed. [Union Public Service Commission
Appellant versus Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela and others,
Civil Appeal No. 933 of 2006, decided on 2/2/2006,
Supreme Court of India, 2006 SCCL.COM 62]
Article 19(i)(g) -Enhancement
of Drug Licence fees-
The
only objection is that the enhancement is exorbitant. It
is held that the enhancement can not be said to so
exorbitant as to amount in unreasonable restriction on
the right of the petitioner to do trade and business
under Article 19(i)(g) of the constitution. Primarily it
is for the Government to decide at what rate licence fee
is to be fixed and not for this court. [Tribhuvan
Mittal vs Union of India and others, C. Misc. W.
P. No. 43487of 2001, Allahabad High Court, decided on
28.4.2003]
Article 19(1)(g)--- Drugs &
Cosmetics Rules, 1945---Rule 106-B-
Prohibition imposed on quantity and percentage of
alcohol in homeopathic medicines—challenged---object
of restriction is to prevent misuse of the quantities of
alcohol that are used in manufacture of Homoeopathic
preparations---restriction reasonable in interest of
general public---does not violate Article
19(1)(g)---writ petition dismissed. [ Shrikrishna
Homoeo Pharmacy vs. Union of India and others, Bombay
High Court, 2006 Drugs Cases (DC) 96]
Article 226-
The petitioner claims to be ayurvedic Vaidyar running
ayurvedic Vaidyasala and certain medicines which are
prescribed for the patients- case of the petitioner
is that the authorities are indiscriminately destroying
all the bottles that are in the pharmacy and that the
petitioners are not selling the medicines to the public
but only to the patients - alcohol in the garb of
Ayurvedic medicine being sold - held if the respondents
have reason to believe that the petitioners are selling
spurious preparations and alcoholic preparations in the
guise of medicines, and the sale is not only to
patients, but to others, they have the liberty to deal
with them in accordance with law (S. Anandaraj vs.
The Superintendent of Police and other, MADRAS HIGH
COURT 2003, Drugs Cases 14)
Appeals by special leave- against the judgment of
Bombay High Court by the manufacturers- importers of
certain bulk drugs and their formulation. The bulk
drugs concerned are seven in number- the challenge is to
the inclusion of the said bulk drugs in the first
schedule to the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995- the
immediate provocation for filing the writ petitions in
the High Court seems to be the notices issued by the
National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, calling upon
some of the Respondent- Companies to deposit the
overcharged amounts in relation to the formulations of
scheduled drug- the notices demanding overcharged
amounts were quashed. The writ petitions were thus
allowed by the Division Bench of High Court-held the
judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ
petitions out of which these appeals arise shall stand
restored to the file of the High Court and the High
Court will have to consider afresh the relevant aspects
concerning the criteria laid down in para 22.7.2 of the
Drugs Policy, 1994 in relation ot each drug, having due
regard to the observations made in the judgment. The
High Court may endeavor to expedite hearing to the
petitions. (Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals &
Fertilizers vs. M/s Cipla Ltd., SUPREME COURT OF INDIA,
2003 Drugs Cases 256)
Article 299-
Rate
contract not issued after acceptance of tender—the
respondents are directed to issue rate contract in
favour of the petitioner in terms of the tender
agreement and according to the law. The petitioner is
directed to file and affidavit before the authority
concerned that he has not been convicted for any offence
punishable under Drugs & Cosmetics Act.[Maheshbhai
Mohanlal Patel vs. State of Gujarat, Gujarat High Court,
2005 Drugs Cases (DC) 147]
II.
Can the Drugs Inspector send sample directly to the
Central Drug Laboratory?
Drugs Inspector can send sample directly to the
Central Drug Laboratory. - There is no
prohibition under the Act or Rules barring the Inspector
from sending the sample directly to the Director,
Central Drug Laboratory Section 25(1) and (4) clearly
contemplate sending of sample directly to the
Central Drug Laboratory. [Ram Shankar Misra,
Appellant V. State of Uttar Pradesh, Respondent, Cri.
Appeal No. 105 of 1972, dated 29/11/1978, Supreme Court,
P.S. Kailasm and O.Chinnapa Reddy, JJ. , 1980 CRI.L.J.
820:AIR 1979 SC 727]
Period of limitation for taking cognizance
The date of report the Govt. Analyst under which
sample is reported not of standard quality should be
taken as the date of commencement of period of
limitation. - The limitation for the purpose
of Section 468 (2) (c) will commence from 2/7/1988, the
date of knowledge of commission of offence to the
concerned officer under
Section 469 (1)(b) and therefore, complaint is
not barred by limitation under Section 468 (2)(c).
[State of Rajasthan, Appellant V. Sanjay Kumar and
others, Respondents, Supreme Court, M.K.Mukharjee and
S.S.Mohammed Quadri, 1998(2) Crimes 321 (SC):1998 Drug
Cases 7 ]
Section 473 -Court’s power to condone delay
Prosecution should explain the delay either in
complaint or by separate application if it wants delay
to be condoned.The Magistrate should apply his mind
to the question of limitation and record that he has
condoned the delay or has taken
cognizance of the offence in the interest of
justice. - The
learned Magistrate, in the present case could not
subsequent to passing the order taking cognizance
condone the delay and extend the period of limitation. The learned Magistrate has without condoning the delay
proceeded to examine witnesses and to frame charge.
This has been done by the learned Magistrate
after the period of limitation and therefore, illegal.
The complaint is therefore quashed. [Jethmal
Himmatmal Jain Petitioners V. The State of Maharashtra,
Respondent, Criminal Application No.1399 of 1980,
decided on 12-3-1981, Bombay High Court, Rele, J., 1984
Drug Cases 30]
Penalty for non-disclosure of the name of the
manufacturer, etc.—
Sentence of imprisonment is not compulsory for
offence punishable under Section 28. -Sentence of
imprisonment is not compulsory for offence punishable
under Section 28. Failure to disclose particulars under
Section 18 A could have happened because respondent is
oblivious of name and address of the person from whom he
purchased rugs. Drugs
recovered were not substandard, spurious or time
expired. Sentence of fine of Rs. 1000/- would be
sufficient to meet the ends of justice. [State
of Orissa, Appellant V. Janmejoy Dinda, Respondent,
Cri.A.No. 219 of 1998, decided on 20.02.1998, Supreme
Court, M.K.Mukherjee and K.T. Thomas, JJ.,1998(1) Crimes
192 (SC)]
Lenient view taken after recording the reasons.
-The appellant is a young man and comes from
respectable family. He has made very candid confession
before the Court in pleading guilty. Appellant sentenced
to imprisonment till rising of Court. [ Moh.
Shabir V. The State of Maharashtra AIR 1979 SC 564: 1979
CRI. L.J. 461].
Rules 49 A and 50 A.Qualifications of Licencing and Controlling Authorities-
Respondents to restrain such medical officers of the state, who do not possess the qualifications to act as Licencing and Controlling Authority under the Rules, besides to cancel the licences issued after 12th April 1989 to those persons who are not qualified under the Rules. Let a writ of mandamus issue accordingly. [D.K. Joshi vs. State of U.P. and others, 2001 Drugs Cases 212, Allahabad High Court, 20.12.2000]
Writ appeal under Clause 15
of the Letter Patent -
Association of unqualified medical practitioners -
recognising those practicing modem medicine - the
circular which is sought to be implemented cannot have
any legal force and this court is not inclined to direct
the Government to implement such circulars as it is
unenforceable in law. But for the said circular, the
members of the association cannot insist the State
Government to issue certificate to enable them to
practice "Medicine". (All India Association vs. State
o Tamil Nadu & Others, MADRAS HIGH COURT, 2003 Drugs
Cases 47)
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956
Sections 10 A, 10 B & 10 C--
The Medical Council of India (MCI) fixed the intake in
the petitioner college to 100. Against this restriction
the college filed a writ petition, the same was
dismissed and the petitioner preferred an appeal. While
allowing the appeal, the High Court at Madras held that,
the only point that arises for consideration is the
power of MCI to pass impugned orders stopping admission
to a medical college which was duly recognized prior to
insertion of Sections 10 A, 10 B & 10 C of the Act and
whether that power could be exercised in violation of
principles of natural justice.
It was held that, the object of all interpretations is
to discover the intention of the legislature, but the
intention of the legislature must be deduced from the
language used and it has to be construed according to
the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the
words of the statute are themselves precise and
unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to
expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense.
[Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore & Another
V. Union of India and others, Madras High Court]
Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970
Section 17 (3) (b)—applicability of the provisions –
the petitioners have prayed for a writ of mandamus
against respondent No.2 that the petitioner should be
granted requisite registration as they are entitled to
practice in State of Gujarat on the basis of their
degrees and registration obtained in Bihar State—the
petitioners have been granted the privilege (including
right to practice) by or under a law relating to
registration for the time being in force in the State of
Bihar and have been enrolled on the state register of
the state of Bihar. On strength of the same the
petitioners should be permitted to be registered on the
Central register as well as the State Register—in so far
as the applicability of provisions of Section 17 (3)
(b) of Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 is
concerned in light of consistent decisions of the Apex
Court the petitioners or persons situated similarly
cannot claim any entitlement under the said provisions
as a matter of right that the should be permitted to
practice Ayurvedic System of Medicine and prescribe
allopathic drugs.[Viswas Rao Shankar Rao Patil vs.
State of Gujarat, Gujarat High Court, 2005 Drugs Cases
(DC) 168]
Bengal Medical Act, 1914
Medical practitioners -- appellants had completed the diploma course of Community Medical Service in duly recognized institutions in the State of West Bengal and were posted in different parts of the State by the Government of West Bengal -- amendment by notification -- single judge of High Court held Diploma Holders will not have the right to private practice and entry in the register is only for the right to prescribe medicines and issue certificates -- Division Bench of High Court relying on A.K. Sabhapathy vs. State of Kerala found that 'a person can practice in allopathic system of medicine in a state or in the country only if he possesses a recognized medical qualification' and since the appellants doesn't possesses the required qualification, it was held that their names could not be included in the Medical Register -- appeal by special leave seeking relief of protection of their 'consequential rights to treat' such as iss
uing prescriptions or sickness or death certificates -- whether the Appellants, who are having the right to treat could issue prescription or sickness or death certificates? -- held once the right to treat is recognized, then the right to prescribe medicine or issue necessary certificate flows from it -- the order of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is restored -- appeal allowed.
[Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal No. 152 of 1994, Subhashis Bakshi & Ors. Appellants versus West Bengal Medical Council & Ors. Respondents decided on 2/14/2003]
Trade and Merchandise Marks Act
Confusing similarity and deception in the names of two drugs " Falcitab" and " Falcigo" used for treatment of the same disease. A stricter approach should be adopted while applying the test to judge the possibility of confusion of one medicinal product for another by the consumer. While confusion in the case of non-medicinal products may be only cause economic loss. Confusion between two medicinal products may have disastrous effects on health and in some cases life itself. [Cadila Health Care Ltd vs. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd, 2001 Drugs Cases 147, Supreme Court Of India, 26.3.2001]
Kerala Pharmacy Council (Amendment) Rules, 1994
Rules which confer powers of entry search and inspection etc. are absolutely essential for carrying out the purpose and object of the Act and are incidental to the exercise of the power under the parent Act. The drugs store in emergency/ casualty/ duty rooms attached to private hospitals will stand exempted from the provisions of the Act relating to obtaining licence.
[Thomas vs. Union of India, 2001 Drugs Cases 1, Kerala High Court, 29.11.99]
Classification of extract as
"drug" based on label stating it might improve symptoms
The
United States Supreme Court has declined to grant
certiorari from a District of Columbia decision that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reasonably
interpreted the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA),
as amended by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA),
in classifying saw palmetto extract, which bore a label
stating that it might improve symptoms associated with
benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), as a "drug." The FDA
acted pursuant to its policy of treating claims
regarding the cure, mitigation, or treatment of existing
disease as drug claims, and exempting from the
definition of "drug" only health claims that concerned
reducing the risk of contracting disease. The Court of
Appeals further held that the FDA did not violate the
marketer's commercial speech rights in using the
marketer's speech, in the form of the label, as a basis
to infer the marketer's intent. Claims about a product
by its manufacturer and vendors, including product
labeling, serve as evidence of the sellers' intent that
consumers will purchase and use the product for a
particular purpose, and, therefore, as evidence whether
the product is or is not a drug. The First Amendment
allows the evidentiary use of speech to establish the
elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent. Thus
it is constitutionally permissible for the FDA to use
speech, in the form of labeling, to infer intent for
purposes of determining that a proposed sale would
constitute the forbidden sale of an unapproved drug, the
Court of Appeals held.
[In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation]
Verdict for $20,000,000 in
pain and suffering damages in medical malpractice case
warranted remittitur
The jury
in a medical malpractice action did not succumb to bias
or prejudice in awarding damages for pain and suffering
in the amount of $15,000,000 to a patient who contracted
a mycobacterial infection during plastic surgery, and in
the amount of $5,000,000 to the patient's husband. The
awards, however, seemed improbable in light of the
damages awarded in comparable cases, and were so great
as to shock the conscience of the court. Thus, a
remittitur of the awards to $10,000,000 for the patient
and $1,000,000 for the husband was warranted. If the
patient and her husband refused the remitted awards, a
new trial on damages would be ordered.
[Source: Westlawinternational.com]
Patents Act,
1970
Sections 11-A and 24-A--Appellant holder of
Process Patent , EMR and Drug Licence for manufacture of
Nadifloxacin 1% Cream---patent and EMR infringed by
first respondent---EMR granted for a short period of 5
years only ending in 2008---respondent manufacturing the
cream on basis of US Patent---as per report of expert,
under the US Patent respondents can only manufacture
ointments other than cream products---prima facie case
made out in favour of appellant , who would suffer
irreparable injury which would not be compensated in
terms of damages or royalty—injunction granted in favour
of appellant.[ Wockhardt Limited vs. Hetero Drugs and
others, Madras High Court, 2006 Drugs Cases (DC)
82]
Antitrust: Agreement to keep
generic drug off market during pendency of patent
litigation
The
United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in an
Eleventh Circuit case in which the question presented is
whether it is per se unlawful under the Sherman Act for
a pharmaceutical patentee to pay a competitor to keep
the competitor's generic drug off the market during the
pendency of patent litigation between the patentee and
the competitor. The Eleventh Circuit held that such
agreements not to compete, to extent they had no broader
exclusionary effect than that provided by the disputed
patents were not per se unlawful. According to the
petition, Congress main purpose in enacting the
legislation was to bring generic drugs onto the market
as rapidly as possible. Brand-name companies are
required to submit to the FDA for listing in the FDA's
"Orange Book" patents they own that claim the drug or a
method of using the drug for which they have received
FDA approval. The petition claims that brand-name
companies list "weak" or "narrow" patents in an effort
to extend their patent protection after patents on the
chemical compound itself have expired, and that a
government study has indicated that that brand-name
companies sued the first generic applicant in nearly 75%
of the cases studied and that the generic prevailed in
73% of those cases.
[Source: Westlawinternational.com]
Antitrust: Agreement to keep
product off market during pendency of patent
infringement suit
Denying
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court has declined
to decide whether an interim settlement of patent
infringement litigation, in which the alleged infringer,
for consideration, agrees to keep its product off the
market until the claim of infringement is resolved,
constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, irrespective of the validity of the claim of
infringement or the reasonableness of the interim
settlement.
The suit involved a generic pharmaceutical company that
was sued by a brand pharmaceutical company for seeking
to sell a generic version of the brand product in
alleged violation of the brand company's patent rights.
When the brand company threatened to seek preliminary
relief to prevent the generic company from selling its
generic drug, the generic company settled by agreeing to
preserve the status quo until the infringement
litigation was resolved. Purchasers of the medication
then sued both companies, alleging the agreement was a
per se illegal restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act.
[Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.]
Doctor found guilty for
falsifying research
A
leading consultant gynaecologist, Dr. Loukas Klentzeris,
has been found guilty of professional misconduct, while
submitting his paper to the European Society of Human
Reproduction and Embryology. In the paper presented in
April 2002, Dr Klentzeris, who had been based at the
University Hospital of Wales, Cardiff, had claimed that
38 women had taken blood tests, when in fact none of
them had. The GMC's professional conduct committee has
decided to conclude Dr Klentzeri's case with a
reprimand. They further reiterated that this was a case
where "He has not only let down not just himself but
also the medical profession at large."
Consumer Forum was primarily
meant to provide better protection to the interests of
the consumers and not to short circuit the matter or
defeat the claims on technical grounds-Whether non-impleading
the treating doctor as party could result in dismissal
of the original petition for non-joinder of necessary
party-
The petitioner's husband was admitted to the National
Heart Institute for medical treatment. But since he did
not received proper medical treatment and on account of
negligence of the doctors of the Heart Institute, he
died. Prior to the said treatment he was being treated
at G.B. Pant Hospital and since there was no improvement
in his condition, his case was referred to the National
Heart Institute by on one of his employers. Later his
angiography had been carried out at the Institute and
blood transfusion had taken place, which resulted in
jaundice and ultimately his death.
The main issue in this case was regarding the amount of
compensation to be awarded in such circumstances. In
addition, the Hon'ble Court was also to decide whether
non-impleading the treating doctor as a party could
result in dismissal of the original petition on grounds
of non-joinder of the necessary parties.
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal held that
the Consumer Forum was primarily meant to provide better
protection to the interests of the consumers and not to
short circuit the matter or defeat the claims on
technical grounds. While examining the relevant facts of
the case, the Court held that it is very difficult for a
patient to give details as to which doctor had treated
the patient and whether the doctor was negligent.
Therefore, the petitioners were not at fault in not
impleading all those doctors who had treated the
patient. Further the Court also said that in cases where
the hospital was negligent and this resulted in the
death of the patient, the burden of proof was on the
hospital and the doctor who treated the patient, to
prove that there was no negligence involved in the
treatment. As regards the payment of compensation, the
Court ordered the respondents to pay an amount of Rs. 45
lacs to the petitioner.
[Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal No. 4024 of
2003, Smt. Savita Garg Vs. The Director, National Heart
Institute decided on 12/10/2004]
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